Sharing corporate tax knowledge with external advisers by Rijt, Pernill van der et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/115273/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Rijt, Pernill van der, Hasseldine, John and Holland, Kevin 2019. Sharing corporate tax knowledge
with external advisers. Accounting and Business Research 49 , pp. 454-473.
10.1080/00014788.2018.1526058 file 
Publishers page: https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2018.1526058
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2018.1526058>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
For Peer Review
 O
nly






	





	 	
		


 

	  !
"#$%	 &
"#$%	 '(
"#$	 "#$!)!*&!*&$(*+&



URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/abr
Accounting and Business Research
For Peer Review
 O
nly
1 
 
	






 
Tax knowledge is critical for companies to comply with tax laws and engage in tax planning 
and avoidance. Firms rely on external advisers in handling tax issues, however, sharing 
corporate tax knowledge with external advisers entails both opportunities and risks. We 
identify four relational factors that are associated with the decision of corporate taxpayers to 
share knowledge with external tax advisers. Survey data from 221 corporate taxpayers reveals 
a novel distinction between operational and strategic knowledge sharing. The operational 
dimension has a functional nature, whereas the strategic dimension has a more intentional 
character. Accessibility to, and a positive experience with, external advisers enables 
operational knowledge sharing. When firms perceive specific tax benefits in relation to 
sharing knowledge, they are more inclined to engage in operational knowledge sharing with 
external advisers but less prone to strategic knowledge sharing. Instead, strategic knowledge 
sharing is enhanced when firms have access to, and value the knowledge of their advisers, 
although this latter factor plays no significant role in explaining operational knowledge 
sharing. A positive experience with advisers also associates with strategic knowledge sharing. 
We link our results to other research and discuss implications for regulators considering, or 
requiring, firm disclosures of corporate tax strategy. 
 


Corporate Tax; Knowledge sharing; Tax advisers; Tax planning 
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
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A complex corporate tax environment means firms must be flexible and agile, while 
remaining tax compliant, in order to adapt to ensuing challenges (Glaister & Frecknall*
Hughes 2008; Ihrig & MacMillan 2015). In response, firms hire external experts, often from 
the Big 4 accounting firms, who possess specialist knowledge (Empson 2004; Gibbins & 
Jamal 1993; Gracia & Oats 2012; Morris & Empson 1998; Mulligan & Oats 2016). External 
experts perform two main functions when acting for their corporate clients, both of which 
involve knowledge sharing between clients and external experts. First, external experts (also 
termed ‘consultants’ and ‘advisers’) help in tax reporting and payment compliance in order to 
minimise tax penalties and the risk of investigation, and second, they initiate and/or advise on 
tax planning (Frecknall*Hughes & Kirchler 2015; OECD 2008).  
Apart from acting as client advocates, tax advisers’ responsibilities also extend to 
include the accounting profession and the public, with tax advisers “play(ing) a vital role in 
all tax systems, helping taxpayers understand and comply with their tax obligations in an 
increasingly complex world” (OECD 2008, p. 5). Yet, the Confédération Fiscale Européenne 
warns that taxpayers must be able to “trust that information shared with their adviser will 
remain confidential and that tax advisers are not watchdogs of the tax administration.” (CFE 
2014, p. 3). In their interactions with external advisers, corporate clients may be aware of 
potential conflicts of interest and take appropriate action or safeguards e.g. limiting extent of 
knowledge flows, and the relationship between corporate clients and external advisers is of a 
complex nature as clients are confronted with both pros and cons related to exchanging 
knowledge with external advisers.
12
  
                                                
1
 Informal discussions with senior officials in two tax administrations suggest that complex taxpayers often 
simultaneously employ advisers from several different firms of advisers. They speculate the motive is to limit 
advisers’ knowledge of clients’ circumstances to well defined discrete aspects. Klassen et al. (2015) report that 
using one’s auditor represents the smallest share of potential sources of tax advice i.e. the firm’s own auditor, 
another external adviser or internal source. While the authors interpret the decision not to use the audit firm as 
being made to protect (perceived) auditor independence, attempting to limit auditors’ access to tax related 
matters is an alternative interpretation.         
2
 The application of legal professional privilege to communications between a client company and its lawyers 
while excluding similar communications with non*lawyers e.g. accountants, distorts companies’ decisions on 
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Knowledge is considered an important intangible organizational resource. It is created 
in social interactions, when experiences and information are shared and interpreted 
(Davenport & Prusak 2000). Knowledge sharing thus entails “more than transferring 
knowledge, but creating it – less exploitation of existing knowledge than generation of new 
knowledge” (Van den Hooff & Huysman 2009, p. 1). Sharing and creating knowledge in an 
inter*organisational context touches upon the essence of the professional service industry such 
as consultancy firms (Løwendahl et al. 2001; Sarvary 1999). Knowledge is shared when 
working on projects for clients, but as a result of interacting with clients new knowledge is 
also developed (Fosstenløkken et al. 2003; Sarvary 1999). This way, value for both clients 
and external advisers is created. 
Prior literature finds that external advisers and clients are interdependent in sharing 
and creating knowledge (Argote & Fahrenkopf 2016; Gluckler & Armbruster 2003; Sturdy et 
al. 2009). Accordingly, companies may consider the benefits and potential risks involved in 
sharing knowledge with external experts, and decide whether their need for external expertise 
outweighs the risks of opening their doors to external experts. To date, little is known about 
the interaction between clients and external experts (Fosstenløkken et al. 2003; Sturdy et al. 
2009) and its implications for sharing knowledge. This study provides more insight in this 
relationship by identifying which relational factors influence the decision of corporate 
taxpayers to engage in processes of knowledge sharing with external tax advisers. 
Specifically, our research question is: Which relational antecedents associate with processes 
of knowledge sharing between corporate taxpayers and external tax advisers? 
Using data from a survey of U.K. corporate taxpayers (Hasseldine et al. 2010) our 
empirical results show a novel distinction between operational and strategic knowledge 
sharing. These types of knowledge sharing have two relational antecedents in common. When 
corporate taxpayers have access to the knowledge of external advisers and when they have 
                                                                                                                                                   
whom to employ to provide advice (Prudential 2013, ICAEW 2016) and arguably the information they choose to 
disclose to their adviser.  
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prior positive experience with their advisers, they are more inclined to engage in operational 
and strategic knowledge sharing. There are also two relational antecedents with a dissimilar 
influence on operational and strategic knowledge sharing. When corporate taxpayers perceive 
specific benefits as a result of engaging in processes of knowledge sharing, operational 
knowledge sharing is enhanced while strategic knowledge sharing is reduced. And the extent 
to which corporate taxpayers value the knowledge of external tax advisers positively 
associates with strategic knowledge sharing but is not significantly related to operational 
knowledge sharing. 
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, our paper contributes to prior 
archival, survey, and critical research on tax planning and tax practice (Feller & Schanz 2017; 
Graham et al. 2014, 2017; Morris & Empson 1998; Mulligan & Oats 2016). Second, by 
gaining insight into processes of knowledge sharing in this specific context – characterised by 
the continuous change of tax legislation, the corporate taxpayers’ obligation to comply with 
legislation, the asymmetric dispersion of specialist knowledge, and a multifaceted relationship 
between corporate taxpayers and external advisers – our study also contributes to the existing 
body of literature on inter*organisational processes of knowledge sharing (Gibbins & Jamal 
1993; 1999; Gracia & Oats 2012). Third, we extend existing insight into relational factors that 
make organisations decide to engage in processes of knowledge sharing with external 
advisers, as interactions between corporate taxpayers and external tax advisers is under 
researched (Frecknall*Hughes & Kirchler 2015; Dyreng & Maydew 2018).  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section draws upon prior literature on the 
client*consultant relationship and knowledge sharing to identify four relational antecedents of 
knowledge sharing, and cast expectations in a conceptual model of knowledge sharing 
between corporate taxpayers and external tax advisers. The third section outlines our method, 
participants and variables. Section four reports the results of our hypothesis testing and 
Section five outlines the study’s conclusions, limitations and implications. 
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The client#consultant relationship 
As a precursor to discussing the possible benefits of knowledge sharing, we first 
outline prior background literature on the client*consultant relationship in order to understand 
the factors surrounding the use of external consultants/advisers. Kitay and Wright (2003) 
suggest that consultants can be seen as either organisational insiders or outsiders. Insiders 
develop social and long*term relationships with clients while outsiders maintain economic 
relationships where they keep more distance from their clients. Both types of consultants 
present their knowledge to clients either as unique and inimitable or as specialised yet 
accessible. Where an insider role is played, consultants involve clients in projects while at the 
same time providing specific expertise, or they work in close cooperation with clients which 
results into knowledge that is jointly created and accessible to all. External consultants as 
outsiders either provide straightforward, standard solutions to clients, or they give ad*hoc 
advice to complex issues without being involved in its implementation. Hence, there is less 
co*creation of knowledge between clients and consultants when consultants take on an 
outsider role. 
Werr and Styhre (2003) investigated the client*consultant relationship from a client 
perspective and concluded that the client*consultant relationship is more ambiguous and 
complex than Kitay and Wright (2003) suggest. In interacting with external consultants, 
organisational clients indicated that they experienced their relationship with consultants as a 
partnership with opportunities to interact and cooperate. However, the clients simultaneously 
observed potential risks in close cooperation with consultants, such as loss of control, which 
triggered them to maintain some distance from their consultants. These findings show that the 
expectations of organisations about the input and involvement of consultants can vary and 
sometimes even be contradictory. Sturdy et al. (2009) find that in practice some potential 
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outcomes of consultancy projects are not defined as explicit objectives. One frequent 
undefined outcome is the flow of knowledge between clients and consultants (the focus of this 
paper). These knowledge flows occur in almost every consultancy project, but often as spin*
offs from formal project goals (Løwendahl et al. 2001). Sturdy et al. (2009) argue there is no 
pre*defined consultant role that best contributes towards this outcome. In reality, consultants 
often take upon more than just one role and consultancy outcomes can be more diverse than 
generally suggested. Consultancy, the authors argue, can be described by “heterogeneity, 
complexity, and dynamism” (p. 631). 
Cooperating with external consultants (advisers) thus works as a double edged sword 
for firms who expect benefits from hiring advisers (i.e. specialist advice and services). Firms 
are not simply passive recipients though, rather, they play an active role in assignments. After 
the hiring decision, clients are involved in processes of knowledge sharing that entail far more 
than simple direct knowledge flows from the adviser to the client. As a result, advisers not 
only provide value to clients on the basis of their expert knowledge, they also develop 
knowledge themselves by working for organisational clients (Fosstenløkken et al. 2003; 
Løwendahl et al. 2001). Fincham (2002) even suggests that advisers depend on their clients 
more heavily than vice versa. Clients are aware that providing access to internal processes and 
assets, including confidential information, could accelerate the emergence of new insights 
among advisers that may be used in assignments for other clients (Sarvary 1999) and could 
potentially benefit competitors (Gluckler & Armbruster 2003). Advisers may seek to 
legitimise their role by gaining client*specific knowledge, seeking client support, 
strengthening strategic relationships, avoiding interaction with unsupportive or rival internal 
actors (Fincham 2002), and by simultaneously offering solutions and calling attention to new 
issues among clients (Fincham 1999; Sturdy 1997). Such legitimisation potentially increases 
the degree to which clients are dependent on external advisers. 
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Clearly, organisations and external advisers maintain complex relationships, yet these 
relationships are rarely studied (Sturdy et al. 2009). Especially knowledge sharing in the 
corporate tax environment has largely been ignored by researchers (Hasseldine et al. 2011). 
 
The decision to share knowledge 
In identifying which relational factors influence the decision of corporate taxpayers to 
share knowledge with external tax advisers we draw on the literature of transactive memory 
systems (Hollingshead 1998; Argote & Fahrenkopf 2016). Individuals who are involved in 
network relationships share a transactive memory system (Hollingshead 1998; Wegner et al. 
1991). These systems can be described as “shared understanding of who knows what” 
(Griffith & Neale 1991, p. 381). People are aware of their own knowledge and they are 
knowledgeable about the knowledge of others in their network. This meta*knowledge allows 
them to locate and access relevant knowledge in the case they need it. The literature suggests 
that people are able to identify their need for knowledge and assess the usability of other 
people’s knowledge (Hsu et al. 2012; Lewis 2003). A developed transactive memory system 
allows individuals to trust in each other’s expertise, enables them to specialise in different 
areas, and helps them to coordinate their work (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak 2008), resulting in 
more effective knowledge sharing and knowledge application (Choi et al. 2010). 
Prior research on transactive memory systems has focused on relationships at an 
interpersonal level (Hollingshead 1998; 2001; Wegner et al. 1991); a team level (Hsu et al. 
2012; Lewis 2003; 2004; Lewis et al. 2005); and at the organisational level (Nevo & Wand 
2005). In this paper, the principles of transactive memory are applied to relationships on the 
inter*organisational level. The corporate tax setting corresponds to the theory of transactive 
memory, in the sense that transactive memory systems are based on the idea that expertise is 
dispersed among different members of a network (Hollingshead 1998; Lewis 2004). With tax 
compliance and planning a knowledge challenge to most firms, they rely on the expertise of 
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external tax advisers. However, hiring external advisers can be costly and even risky. As a 
result, we expect corporate taxpayers to have a highly developed sense of (limitations with 
regard to) the level of their own tax knowledge. Moreover, we expect corporate taxpayers to 
be critical (or strategic) in assessing whether the expertise of external tax advisers is relevant 
– perhaps even more critical than members in other networks, as corporate taxpayers cannot 
afford to turn to external tax advisers for every small trifle.  
 
Conceptual model and hypotheses 
We hypothesise that the decision of corporate taxpayers to engage in processes of 
knowledge sharing with external tax advisers is associated with four relational antecedents, 
broadly based on Borgatti and Cross (2003): perceived value, access, benefits, and 
experience. Our expectations are shown in Figure 1 and then discussed. 

 !"


Figure 1: Conceptual model 
 
Insight into the expertise of others is a basic requirement for deciding whom to turn to 
when in need of knowledge (Hollingshead 1998; 2001; Wegner et al. 1991) yet it is also 
important to assess the relevance and usability of that knowledge (Dyer & Singh 1998; Lewis 
2003). Corporate taxpayers are expected to value the knowledge of their advisers and decide 
whether it is worthwhile engaging external expertise. Prior research findings on the individual 
level (Borgatti & Cross 2003), team level (Choi et al. 2010) and organisational level (Van den 
Hooff & Huysman 2009) confirm a positive influence of understanding (the usability of) the 
knowledge of others on knowledge sharing processes. Translating these findings to the inter*
organisational corporate tax context, we expect that the decision of corporate taxpayers to 
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share knowledge with external tax advisers depends on the extent to which they value the 
knowledge of these advisers. 
#! The more corporate taxpayers value the knowledge of external tax advisers, the 
more likely they are to engage in processes of knowledge sharing with external tax 
advisers. 
Knowing and valuing external expertise does not necessarily imply that access to 
expertise is guaranteed. Lewis (2003, p. 588) states, “transactive memory develops as a 
function of a person’s beliefs about the knowledge possessed by another person and about the 
accessibility of that knowledge”. Accessibility is thus also considered to be an important 
aspect in relationships where individuals, teams or organisations rely on each other’s 
knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). Borgatti and Cross (2003) argue that accessibility has 
more to do with the relational, than the technical availability of knowledge. Accessibility 
depends on the capabilities of the requesters to actually engage in processes of knowledge 
sharing. Previous empirical research shows that the accessibility to expertise of others, as part 
of transactive memory systems, contributes to communication and knowledge sharing 
between individuals and in teams (Borgatti & Cross 2003; Choi et al. 2010; Hsu et al. 2012).  
Given the inter*organisational tax context in our study, we expect that: 
#$ The more corporate taxpayers have access to the knowledge of external tax 
advisers, the more likely they are to engage in processes of knowledge sharing with 
external tax advisers. 
With interdependencies between corporate taxpayers and external tax advisers, 
processes of knowledge sharing are a double*edged sword for corporate taxpayers, with 
potential benefits but also potential costs, other than advisory fees, of engaging with advisers 
(Hasseldine et al. 2011). Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak (2008) show that members of ego*centered 
networks who distrust the goodwill of other members, are able to manage the risk that these 
others will use valued and confidential knowledge to their own benefit. Firms can thus protect 
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their own interests in partnerships thereby enabling successful knowledge collaborations. In a 
similar fashion, we do not expect corporate taxpayers to be helpless creatures in their 
relationships with external tax advisers. Corporate taxpayers may perceive a diversity of 
possible benefits, including intellectual advantages such as more tax knowledge and a better 
understanding of tax risks, economic advantages, a limitation of perceived tax risks and an 
increase in their feeling of security and protection, and a relational improvement with tax 
legislators. Hasseldine et al. (2011) find that corporate taxpayers recognise such benefits of 
working with external advisers while simultaneously being alert to potential risks involved. 
This leads to: 
#% The more corporate taxpayers perceive processes of knowledge sharing with 
external tax advisers as beneficial, the more likely they are to engage in such 
processes. 
Relational social capital is generally described as “the kind of personal relationships 
people have developed with each other through a history of interactions” (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal 1998, p. 244) and is regarded as a form of mutual trust. Sharing prior experiences 
with others contributes to the development of transactive memory and the “ability to elaborate 
diverse information” (Van Knippenberg et al. 2004, p. 1019). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) 
believe that strong relations between employees enables the creation of intellectual capital in 
organisations and other studies indeed find that relational social capital contributes towards 
knowledge sharing within firms (Van den Hooff & Huysman 2009; Hau et al. 2013).  
Van Wijk et al. (2008) report a meta*analysis investigating various antecedents and 
outcomes of knowledge sharing and conclude that the relational dimension of social capital is 
the most important relational characteristic in explaining knowledge sharing both within and 
between organisations. Their finding implies that over a large number of empirical studies, 
strong relationships between organisations indeed contribute towards inter*organisational 
processes of knowledge sharing. Gluckler and Armbruster (2003) find that many client*
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consultant relationships have an ongoing nature, and organisations tend to continue to work 
with consultants with whom they share a history, without considering what other consultants 
have to offer and regardless of the competence of other consultants. Also other research 
findings confirm that positive prior experiences and a valued and trusted relationship with 
consultants contributes towards cooperation and knowledge sharing (Ko 2010; Werr & Styhre 
2003). Consequently, we expect to find a similar outcome in the prior experience between 
corporate taxpayers and external tax advisers. 
#& The more corporate taxpayers have experienced a prior positive experience with 
external tax advisers, the more likely they are to engage in processes of knowledge 
sharing with external tax advisers. 
  
'

We obtained our dataset from a quantitative study of U.K. Corporate Sector panel 
members of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA).
3
 Based on prior 
qualitative research (Hasseldine et al. 2011) and pilot testing, a questionnaire was developed 
to investigate which relational antecedents (or factors) contribute to knowledge sharing 
processes between corporate taxpayers and external tax advisers. The questionnaire was 
hosted on an independent website and links were shared by the ACCA. We received 221 
responses comprising 180 fully completed on the variables in our conceptual model and a 
further 41 that are partially completed. In formulating the conceptual model we use the 
sample of 180 responses and in testing the resulting models we first use the sample of 180 
response, and then a reduced sample of 166 observations for further analyses.
4
  
 
Participants 
                                                
3
 The ACCA has statutory recognition and is a U.K. based institute for professional accountants with 
membership via examination. At the time of the survey, there were 18,926 Corporate Sector panel members. The 
ACCA was not involved in the design of the survey nor did it have control over its content. 
4
 Of the fully completed 180 responses, 14 had missing values with respect to control variables hence the 
subsequent testing on the reduced sample of 166. 
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The companies in which the 180 participants are employed, operate in a variety of 
industries. Financial and insurance sector (13%), manufacturing (14%), construction (13%), 
and information and communication (9%) represent the largest industries in our sample. The 
number of employees averaged 10,781 employees, although the median is 170 employees. By 
EU size classifications (number of employees), the number of firms are Micro (7 firms), 
Small (45 firms), Medium (44 firms) and Large (84 firms). 
The participants indicate that their company interacts with approximately nine tax 
jurisdictions on average, with a range of one to 150. Participants have been employed by their 
company for seven years on average (median 4.25 years), with a maximum of 35 years. 
Corresponding almost exactly to the population of members, 69% of participants are 35–54 
years old and, 36% of participants are female, also representative of the population of the 
ACCA Corporate Sector Panel (35% female). 
 
Independent variables 
The questionnaire used scale measures for all four independent variables hypothesised 
in Figure 1 and were all anchored: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree, allowing us to 
simply average the scale item scores. The scale to measure value consists of three items and is 
based on an existing measurement developed by Borgatti and Cross (2003). In their social 
network analysis, Borgatti and Cross used single*item measurements on the individual level. 
Like Hsu et al. (2012), we translated the measurement of value to our own research context, 
and extended it into a three*item scale shown in Table 1.
5
 An item that exemplifies the scale 
is: “The external adviser’s awareness of legislation is important to my organisation”. 
Reliability analysis shows that the scale has a good reliability (α = .80).  
                                                
5 A principal component analysis with direct oblimin rotation was conducted to determine whether the scale was 
unidimensional. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant (χ
2
(3) = 235.271, p < 0.001) and the Kaiser*Meyer*
Olking measure was 0.63, suggesting an adequate factorability. The three items form a unidimensional scale: 
only one component has an eigenvalue above 1 (initial eigenvalue is 2.19), explaining 72.9% of the total 
variance. 
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The scale to measure access consists of four items. These items are also based on an 
existing measurement developed by Borgatti and Cross (2003). Similar to the measurement of 
value, we adjusted the measurement of access to our research context. In addition, we 
extended the scale by adding items that more explicitly measured the capabilities of corporate 
taxpayers to engage in processes of knowledge sharing with external tax advisers, 
corresponding to the transactive memory scale of Choi et al. (2010).
6
 For example, one item 
in the scale, shown in Table 1, is “My organisation possesses sufficient expertise to share 
knowledge with the external tax adviser(s)”. Reliability analysis shows that the scale has a 
good reliability (α = 0.81). 
The scale to measure benefits comprises six items (originally eight) shown in Table 1. 
We formulated a range of possible benefits that corporate taxpayers may experience as a 
result of working with external tax advisers. Some of these benefits are more general, such as 
the item “Sharing knowledge with the external tax adviser(s) is financially beneficial”. 
However, we also included items much more specific to the context of our study, e.g., “The 
external tax adviser facilitates reaching agreement between my organisation and HMRC”.  
Principal components analysis showed the original eight items formed a two*
dimensional scale: the first component has an initial eigenvalue of 3.62, explaining 45.3% of 
the total variance, and the second component has an initial eigenvalue of 1.30, explaining 
16.2% of the total variance.
7
 The correlation between the two components is on the 0.32 
threshold (r = 0.32), suggesting an oblimin rotation in this analysis. All of the eight items 
                                                
6
 A principal component analysis with direct oblimin rotation was again performed to determine scale 
unidimensionality. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant (χ
2
(6) = 284.255, p < 0.001) and the Kaiser*Meyer*
Olking measure was 0.71, suggesting adequate factorability. The four items form a unidimensional scale: only 
one component has an eigenvalue above 1 (initial eigenvalue is 2.55), explaining 63.7% of the total variance. 
7
 The analysis with direct oblimin rotation was conducted to determine whether the scale was unidimensional. 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ
2
(28) = 543.891, p < 0.001) and the Kaiser*Meyer*Olking measure 
was 0.82, suggesting an adequate factorability. 
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have a primary factor loading of at least 0.4. However, two items had a cross*loading above 
0.32 and were removed from the scale (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001).
8
 
The remaining six items formed a two*dimensional scale and a principal component 
analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on the six items.
9
 After rotation, the first 
component has an eigenvalue of 2.35, explaining 39.2% of the total variance, and the second 
component has an eigenvalue of 1.75, explaining 29.1% of the total variance. Table 1 lists the 
factor loadings for the principal component analysis with varimax rotation. The first 
component, termed “general benefits” consists of three items that describe possible benefits of 
sharing knowledge with external tax advisers on a broad spectrum. These items represent 
financial, intellectual and reputational benefits (α = 0.86). The second component, termed 
“specific benefits” consists of three items that describe more specific benefits of sharing 
knowledge with external tax advisers, including the assessment of risks, the facilitation of 
agreement with tax legislators, and the provision of insurance (α = 0.61). 
!
"
Experience is measured using the two items describing how corporate taxpayers 
experience their current relationship with external tax advisers (“My organisation has a good 
relationship with the external tax adviser(s)”) and the prior experience they have with these 
advisers (“My organisation has positive experiences with the external tax adviser(s)”). The 
two items are strongly correlated, r = 0.70, p <0.01 and α = 0.82. 
 
Dependent variable 
Knowledge sharing is measured using a scale of seven items (originally eight) shown 
in Table 2 anchored 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. The scale comprises of items 
that measure knowledge sharing activities initiated by both external tax advisers (e.g., “Tax 
                                                
8 “Sharing knowledge with the external tax adviser(s) enables the determination of the correct tax liability” and 
“Sharing knowledge with the external tax adviser(s) enables a decrease in tax liability”. 
9 Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2(15) = 384.313, p < 0.001) and the Kaiser*Meyer*Olking measure 
was 0.73, suggesting an adequate factorability. All of the six items have a primary factor loading of at least 0.4 
and none of the items have a cross*loading above 0.32 (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). 
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advisers inform my organisation about tax matters unprompted”) and corporate taxpayers 
(e.g., “My organisation provides feedback to tax advisers about tax matters”).  
Principal component analysis showed the original eight items form a two*dimensional 
scale: the first component has an initial eigenvalue of 3.79, explaining 47.3% of the total 
variance, and the second component has an initial eigenvalue of 1.07, explaining 13.4% of the 
total variance.
10
 The correlation between the two components exceeds the 0.32 threshold (r = 
.46), suggesting an oblimin rotation is suitable (Brown 2009). All of the eight items have a 
primary factor loading of at least 0.4. However, one item had a cross*loading above 0.32 and 
was removed from the scale (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001).
11
 
A principal component analysis with direct oblimin rotation was then conducted on the 
remaining seven items. The analysis shows that the seven items form a two*dimensional 
scale.
12
 The first component has an initial eigenvalue of 3.43, explaining 49.0% of the total 
variance, and the second component has an initial eigenvalue of 1.07, explaining 15.3% of the 
total variance.  
Table 2 shows the factor loadings for the principal component analysis with direct 
oblimin rotation. The first component “operational knowledge sharing” consists of four items 
that describe how corporate taxpayers experience the knowledge flows with external tax 
advisers, for instance how proactive they think their advisers are, and reflects adviser*
instigated knowledge sharing (α = 0.80).  
The second component “strategic knowledge sharing” consists of three items that 
describe the strategic usage of the expertise of external tax advisers by corporate taxpayers. 
The items in this component focus on intentional knowledge flows where the corporate 
                                                
10
 The analysis with direct oblimin rotation was conducted to determine whether the scale was unidimensional. 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ
2
(28) = 578.013, p < 0.001) and the Kaiser*Meyer*Olking measure 
was 0.79, suggesting an adequate factorability. 
11
 “My organisation is motivated to share knowledge with the external tax adviser(s)”. 
12 The correlation between the two components is still beyond the 0.32 threshold (r = 0.44), indicating that the 
analysis is suitable for further interpretation. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ
2
(21) = 511.491, p < 
0.001) and the Kaiser*Meyer*Olking measure was 0.76, suggesting an adequate factorability. All of the seven 
items have a primary factor loading of at least 0.4 and none of the items have a cross*loading above 0.32 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). 
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taxpayer has an active approach towards taxation, e.g. “My organisation uses tax advisers in 
implementing and applying tax knowledge”. This component reflects taxpayer*instigated 
knowledge sharing (α = 0.73). 
 When repeated on the reduced sample of 166 observations the same two factors are 
identified. However, one variable “cross” loads on both factors with values of 0.321 and 
0.650 respectively, though the lower value of 0.321 is marginally higher than a standard rule 
cut off of 0.32 (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001).  
$
"
This distinction between operational and strategic knowledge sharing is novel and 
implies a specification of the concept of knowledge sharing in the inter*organisational 
context. In analyses contained in the next section, we therefore continue to make a distinction 
between operational and strategic knowledge sharing. We investigate if the relational 
antecedents are associated with the decision of corporate taxpayers to engage in processes of 
both operational and strategic knowledge sharing with external tax advisers. 
 
(
Means, standard deviations and correlations are reported in Table 3. In the correlation 
analysis, five possible control variables are included. First, the need for tax knowledge. This 
variable indicates the extent to which corporate taxpayers experience a high need for tax 
knowledge. Second, the provision of in*house tax specialists, which measures if the 
organisation’s tax responsibilities are dealt with by external advisers or by internal staff. It 
shows the extent to which organisations consider they have the ability to deal with taxation 
internally and can therefore be perceived as an indicator of self*efficacy. Third, HMRC as a 
knowledge source. In learning about tax matters, organisations can use HMRC as an alternate 
source of knowledge, instead of or next to external tax advisers. This variable measures the 
extent to which organisations perceive HMRC as an important knowledge source. The final 
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two control variables measure company characteristics, i.e., firm size measured by the number 
of employees, and the number of tax jurisdictions the organisation interacts with. The 
correlation matrix shows that the main variables in our study are all significantly correlated. 
The control variables are not significantly or weakly (maximum r = *.28) associated with the 
main variables. 
%
"
Because we found a distinction between operational and strategic knowledge sharing, 
all hypotheses were tested for both types of knowledge sharing. We conducted two sets of 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses. Each set consists of three regression models. In the 
first model, only control variables were included while the main independent variables were 
added in a second model. In the third model the variable strategic (operational) knowledge 
sharing is added to capture any interaction between operational and strategic knowledge 
sharing.
13
 Table 4 presents the results of these analyses.
14
 
&
"
For operational knowledge sharing, we tested the association of the independent 
variables value, access, general and specific benefits, and experience with operational 
knowledge sharing. The regression model (model 2) is significant, F(10, 169) = 15.82, p < 
0.001, with an adjusted R
2
 of 0.397. Operational knowledge sharing is positively related to 
access, β = 0.430, t = 3.63, p = 0.000, specific benefits β = 0.170, t = 2.13, p = 0.004, and 
experience β = 0.197, t = 1.92, p = .020. Value, β = *0.018, t = 0.19, ns, general benefits β = *
0.023, t = 0.21, ns, and with the exception of the number of tax jurisdictions β = 0.067, t = 
2.09, p = 0.04 none of the control variables are significantly related to operational knowledge 
sharing. As a robustness test we extend model 2 by adding an additional independent variable 
                                                
13 We thank a reviewer for suggesting this approach.   
14
 In all regression models, the VIF values are below 10 (the highest VIF level is 2.99), which shows that there is 
no problematic collinearity in our data, see also footnote 15 and 16. 
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Strategic knowledge sharing to give model 3.
15
 In model 3 this variable is positively 
associated with Operational knowledge sharing β = 0.250, t = 2.50, p = 0.00. The results of 
model 3 are qualitatively the same as those in model 2 with the exception the variable 
experience is no longer statistically significant at 0.05. 
For strategic knowledge sharing, we tested the association of the independent variables 
value, access, general and specific benefits, and experience with strategic knowledge sharing. 
The regression model (model 2) is significant, F(10, 169) = 20.337, p < .001, with an adjusted 
R
2
 of 0.550 Strategic knowledge sharing is positively related to value β = 0.417, t = 4.45, p = 
0.000, and access β = 0.382 t = 3.85, p = 0.000. Specific benefits have a negative relation with 
strategic knowledge sharing, β = *0.147, t = 2.30, p = 0.026 with experience having a positive 
association β = 0.165, t = 1.66, p = 0.025. General benefits, β = *0.036, t = 0.36, ns, are not 
significantly associated with strategic knowledge sharing. The control variables Need for tax 
knowledge β = 0.087, t = 1.76, p = 0.025, Provision of tax specialists β = *0.093, t = 1.72, p = 
0.025 and HMRC as a Knowledge Source β = 0.091, t = 2.01, p = 0.025 are significantly 
related to strategic knowledge sharing. We also extend model 2 by adding an additional 
independent variable Operational knowledge sharing to give model 3.
16
 In model 3 this 
variable is positively associated with Strategic knowledge sharing β = 0.187, t = 2.19, p = 
0.001. The results of model 3 are qualitatively the same as those in model 2.
17
 
We test the robustness of the above results in the following ways. As discussed in 
footnote 4, the 180 responses include partially completed responses with respect to the control 
variables. If these observations are removed and the hypotheses tested on the 166 fully 
complete responses the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4 with the 
                                                
15
 The addition of this variable significantly increases the adjusted R
2
 as reported in Table 4. Together with a 
maximum VIF of 2.99 this result suggests the set of independent variables in model 3 does not exhibit 
problematic collinearity. 
16 The addition of this variable significantly increases the adjusted R2 as reported in table 4. Together with a 
maximum VIF of 2.68 this results suggests the set of independent variables in model 3 does not exhibit 
problematic collinearity. 
17
 There is no evidence of endogeneity (simultaneity) in either version of model 2 i.e. with the dependent 
variable comprising Operational knowledge sharing or Strategic knowledge sharing respectively.  In all cases the 
null hypothesis of the Wu*Hausman test cannot be rejected at acceptable significance levels. We thank a 
reviewer for raising this point. 
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exception that the variable experience is no longer significant at the 5% level. We also 
estimate the results on reduced samples, firstly after excluding eight “non*engaged” 
respondents,
18
 and secondly, after excluding respondents with extreme values of the two 
control variables – number of jurisdictions and number of employees.
19
 In both cases, the 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4. Finally, in the preceding analysis 
the composite variables are factor based scores derived from an equal weighting of the items 
loading on each factor. We relax this assumption of equal weighting by using (weighted) 
Factor Scores based on the relative loadings of each item on a factor. Results based on these 
Factor Scores are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4 with two exceptions. In model 3 
Operational knowledge sharing (Strategic knowledge sharing), the variable Strategic 
knowledge sharing (Operational knowledge sharing) is no longer statistically significant at the 
5% level.
20
  
On the basis of these results, hypothesis 1 is partially supported. The more corporate 
taxpayers value the knowledge of external tax advisers, the more likely they are to engage in 
processes of strategic knowledge sharing with external tax advisers. However, the same does 
not apply to processes of operational knowledge sharing. Hypothesis 2 is fully supported by 
the results. The more corporate taxpayers have access to the knowledge of external tax 
advisers, the more likely they are to engage in processes of operational and strategic 
knowledge sharing with external tax advisers. In hypothesis 3, it was expected that the more 
corporate taxpayers would perceive processes of knowledge sharing with external tax advisers 
as beneficial, the more likely they were to engage in such processes. We tested this hypothesis 
with two types of benefits, and found that general benefits did not have any significant 
association with operational or strategic knowledge sharing. However, when corporate 
                                                
18 “Non*engaged” respondents were defined as respondents with a zero standard deviation of their responses 
across the attitudinal questions. 
19
 The extreme values of the two variables, Number of Jurisdictions and Number of Employees were defined 
after visually examining the data as values in excess of 48 and 98,000 respectively, resulting in the respective 
exclusion of 10 and 5 cases.  
20
 We do not report in the paper the three sets of regression analyses discussed, but they are presented in a 
separate appendix that is available via an email request to the corresponding author. 
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taxpayers perceived specific benefits related to sharing knowledge with external tax advisers, 
they were more inclined to engage in processes of operational knowledge sharing. 
Conversely, specific benefits were found to negatively relate to the likelihood to engage in 
processes of strategic knowledge sharing. This shows that there are mixed outcomes for 
hypothesis 3. Finally, hypothesis 4 is marginally supported by the results. The more corporate 
taxpayers experience a positive prior experience with external tax advisers, the more likely 
they are to engage in processes of operational and strategic knowledge sharing with external 
tax advisers. However, a robustness check (Model 3) shows insignificant results for 
experience. 
The findings of the separate regression analyses (from Model 2) are shown in relation 
to our conceptual model in Figure 2. 
 
 $"
 
Figure 2: Summary of findings applied to conceptual model 
 
 
 
	



This study extends prior corporate tax research. Mulligan and Oats (2016) find in*
house tax professionals are an elite group of knowledge experts who can shape law and 
practices. Graham et al. (2017, p. 3129) however report that less than 13% of their sample 
firms correctly used the firm’s marginal tax rate (MTR) in capital structure and investment 
decisions. Rather, their surveyed tax professionals used either a statutory tax rate or an 
average effective tax rate (ETR) in corporate decision*making, which is inconsistent with 
finance theory, but may be consistent with psychological heuristics and biases. Therefore, 
understanding how, and why, in*house tax professionals decide whether, or not, to share 
corporate tax knowledge with external tax advisers is important to document. By identifying 
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the relational antecedents that contribute to knowledge sharing processes between corporate 
taxpayers and their external tax advisers, we provide a distinct baseline for other research 
documenting economic incentives to avoid taxes. Archival studies, such as Graham et al. 
(2014) and Klassen et al. (2017), explore the incentives for tax planning and avoidance, and 
analyse the economic / reputational consequences on firm ETRs without considering the prior 
step of knowledge sharing with the firm’s external tax advisers.  
We provide a baseline test of four key relational antecedents: the extent to which 
corporate taxpayers value the knowledge of external tax advisers, have access to this 
knowledge, perceive benefits as a result of engaging in processes of knowledge sharing, and 
share prior positive experience with advisers.  
Our data indicates a difference between general and specific benefits related to sharing 
knowledge with external tax advisers. General benefits represent advantages on a broad 
spectrum, entailing financial, intellectual and reputational advantages. These advantages reach 
beyond taxation; they are not explicitly related to tax matters. In contrast, specific benefits are 
inextricably linked with tax, comprising the assessment of tax risks, facilitating agreement 
with tax agencies, and the provision of an insurance function by external tax advisers. 
Because of the clear distinction between general and specific benefits, we distinguished both 
types of benefits in our empirical analyses.  
Additionally, a distinction between two different types of knowledge sharing emerged, 
which we classify as operational and strategic knowledge sharing. Operational knowledge 
sharing concerns daily practices regarding knowledge sharing activities with external tax 
advisers, and is often adviser*instigated. From the viewpoint of the corporate taxpayer, the 
activities of both corporate taxpayers and external tax advisers are assessed. It entails the 
extent to which firms provide feedback to their advisers and believe that their advisers are 
active and pro*active in sharing tax knowledge. Such operational knowledge flows are 
functional and can be considered a basic necessity in interacting with external tax advisers. 
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Strategic knowledge sharing, on the other hand, reflects a firm’s strategic utilisation of the 
expertise of external tax advisers. This type of knowledge sharing is focused on knowledge 
flows that are intentional. It entails more than just the way in which knowledge flows are 
perceived. Instead, strategic knowledge flows provide insight into the extent to which 
corporate taxpayers purposefully engage in processes of knowledge sharing with external tax 
advisers and the willingness of these advisers to share knowledge once employed. Central to 
strategic knowledge sharing is the intentional nature of the relationship between corporate 
taxpayers and external tax advisers and the active approach of corporate taxpayers towards 
tax. Given this differentiation between operational and strategic knowledge sharing, we 
measured the association of the identified relational antecedents with operational and strategic 
knowledge sharing separately. 
Focusing on operational knowledge sharing, our results show corporate taxpayers are 
inclined to engage in such processes when they have access to their external tax advisers, 
when they perceive specific tax benefits in relation to sharing knowledge, and when they have 
a positive experience with their advisers. Although we found a positive association of specific 
tax benefits with operational knowledge sharing, we did not find a similar relation with 
general benefits. Our data shows that firms do recognise general benefits as a result of sharing 
knowledge with advisers, although they were not statistically significant in explaining 
operational knowledge sharing. Firms may regard intellectual, reputational and financial 
advantages as a bonus to sharing tax knowledge, but not as a motivation to engage in such 
processes. In contrast to general benefits, specific benefits are more tangible and develop over 
a shorter time and are therefore easier to quantify, with immediately visible effects. 
Turning to strategic knowledge sharing, slightly different patterns are visible. 
Processes of strategic knowledge sharing between corporate taxpayers and external tax 
advisers are enhanced when organisations value the knowledge of their advisers, when their 
advisers are accessible, and when they have a positive experience with their advisers. Similar 
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to operational knowledge sharing, general benefits did not significantly relate to strategic 
knowledge sharing. The lack of a significant relationship between general benefits and either 
form of knowledge sharing suggests the decision to share is based on more tangible, 
quantifiable factors as captured by the specific benefits. And whereas we found a positive 
relationship between specific benefits and operational knowledge sharing, a negative 
relationship between specific benefits and strategic knowledge sharing was found. 
The relationship between specific benefits and knowledge sharing may be explained 
by the willingness to take liability over tax issues. Strategic knowledge sharing reveals that 
corporate taxpayers are more involved in and active towards tax than in operational 
knowledge sharing. This involvement suggests that they feel more responsible and can 
possibly be held accountable for tax decisions and outcomes. When firms want to reap 
specific tax benefits, they are more inclined to lay the burden of responsibility with their tax 
advisers. For example, with regard to companies’ risk attitude to tax avoidance, because of 
concerns over potential adverse reputational effects surrounding tax aggressiveness (Holland 
et al. 2016), corporate taxpayers with high risk preferences are less likely to share strategic 
knowledge with external advisers, as such sharing may require them to be explicit about their 
tax risk preferences.
21
 Such concerns are consistent with the finding that firms which prepare 
their own tax returns are associated with more tax aggressiveness than firms that use their 
auditors to prepare their tax returns (Klassen et al. 2015). 
The different nature of the two types of knowledge sharing may also explain the 
different impact of value on operational and strategic knowledge sharing. Our results show 
that valuing external advisers does not affect operational knowledge sharing, which is more 
adviser*instigated (or ‘supply’ driven), but does positively influence strategic knowledge 
sharing, which is more ‘demand’ driven. Because strategic knowledge sharing is such an 
intentional and purposeful process, corporate taxpayers must be careful in selecting the ‘right’ 
                                                
21 A general unwillingness to disclose is consistent with the observation that firms rarely voluntarily publish their 
compliance risk rating produced by HMRC’s “Business Risk Review”. This even holds for firms classified by 
HMRC as being “Low (Compliance) Risk”. 
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adviser for the job. This explains why valuing the expertise of external advisers is relevant in 
explaining strategic knowledge sharing. Corporate taxpayers who value their external advisers 
as a source of supportive knowledge may find this security encourages them to take more 
responsibility towards tax issues and engage in processes of strategic knowledge sharing. 
All in all, our study provides clues into how to facilitate processes of knowledge 
sharing in the corporate tax environment, which in turn may lead to positive economic 
consequences for corporate taxpayers. Relational factors appear to play an important role in 
the decision of firms to share knowledge with external advisers. It is essential for external 
advisers to be aware of the intentions and potential involvement of their clients in sharing tax 
knowledge. This will determine whether or not it is important to emphasise their value and 
specific benefits. In any case, processes of knowledge sharing between firms and external 
advisers benefit from advisers being accessible to their clients and generating successive 
positive experiences. 
The usual limitations associated with survey research are present in this study 
including issues such as non*response bias, an inability to document causality and trends over 
time, and a lack of generalizability due to the participants being 221 U.K. members of an 
ACCA Corporate Sector panel who answered one survey instrument. However, the value of a 
survey approach is that it allowed us to directly ask corporate taxpayers about the processes 
and perceived value of knowledge sharing with their external tax advisers given that this 
information is not available in any commercial database. 
Our study reports associations between our variables and given that this study cannot 
infer causality, future research might focus on the two types of knowledge sharing we 
classify, both in tax and other consultancy contexts, and investigate how robust they are in 
different corporate settings, and under which conditions one or both types of knowledge 
sharing can emerge and flourish. Further research might also explore linking tax risk attitudes 
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to knowledge sharing and investigating how companies decide when, or whether, to use either 
in*house or external advisers, or both, and the economic consequences of these decisions. 
Lastly, our study raises implications for accounting regulators. If firms are reluctant to 
share specific forms of information with their professional advisers, this may reduce the 
ability of professional accounting institutes to regulate the actions of their members and, 
indirectly, the tax behaviour of firms. A corollary of a reluctance to share is that external 
parties, e.g. shareholders, may not be able to rely on firm managers to make voluntary 
disclosures about companies’ tax actions. Consequently, if increased shareholder monitoring 
of companies’ tax behaviour is considered desirable, mandatory increased disclosures could 
be introduced. Financial reporting standard setters have been slow to recognise the limitations 
of current disclosure requirements, and as a consequence there is recent evidence that tax 
administrations are attempting to fill this information vacuum. For example, from 2016 
HMRC requires U.K. companies with a balance sheet over £2 billion, or sales turnover 
exceeding £200 million, to publish their tax strategy explaining the firm’s attitude to tax 
planning and how tax risks are managed with penalties for non*compliance (HMRC 2016). 
Part of this published tax strategy must include why the firm might seek external tax advice, 
their tax planning motives, and the importance of each to the firm’s tax strategy. The impact 
of this disclosure initiative on firms’ tax planning and avoidance activity, if any, remains to be 
seen. 
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A. Benefits * Factor loadings principal component analysis with varimax rotation 
 
General benefits Specific benefits
Sharing knowledge with the external tax adviser(s) is intellectually beneficial. *+,! 0.17
Sharing knowledge with the external tax adviser(s) is reputationally beneficial. *+-. *0.01
Sharing knowledge with the external tax adviser(s) is financially beneficial. *+-/ 0.29
The external adviser facilitates reaching agreement between my organisation and HMRC. 0.21 *+-!
The external adviser is helpful in assessing my organisation's tax risks. 0.17 *+00
The use of an external adviser is designed to provide a form of insurance. 0.01 *+.$
Eigenvalue 2.35 1.75
Percentage of explained variance 39.19 29.09
Cronbach's alpha 0.86 0.61  
 
B. Relational antecedent scale items and reliability analyses 
 
Items in scales
Cronbach's 
alpha
Value 0.80
Tax advisers are an important source for my organisation in learning about tax matters.
The external adviser's awareness of legislation is important to my organisation.
The external adviser's experience in the practicalities of complying with tax legislation is important to my organisation.
Access 0.81
My organisation has the ability to share knowledge with the external tax adviser(s).
My organisation has sufficient opportunities to share knowledge with the external tax adviser(s).
My organisation finds the external tax adviser(s) accessible.
My organisation possesses sufficient expertise to share knowledge with the external tax adviser(s).
Experience 0.82
My organisation has a good relationship with the external tax adviser(s).
My organisation has positive experiences with the external tax adviser(s).  
 





















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Operational 
knowledge sharing
Strategic    
knowledge sharing
Tax advisers inform my organisation about tax matters unprompted. *+., 0.16
Tax advisers ask my organisation for feedback on tax matters. *+,$ *0.05
My organisation provides feedback to tax advisers about tax matters. *+-0 *0.10
The external adviser is proactive in suggesting tax planning opportunities to my organisation. *+.$ 0.10
My organisation uses tax advisers to acquire tax knowledge. 0.16 *+0,
My organisation uses tax advisers in implementing and applying tax knowledge. 0.12 *+-&
The external adviser(s) is willing to share tax knowledge when employed by my organisation. *0.10 *+.0
Eigenvalue 3.43 1.07
Percentage of explained variance 48.99 15.32
Cronbach's alpha 0.80 0.73  
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Variables M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Value 4.26 0.59 180
2 Access 3.75 0.67 180 0.43 **
3 General benefits 3.61 0.78 180 0.44 ** 0.69 **
4 Specific benefits 3.74 0.59 180 0.56 ** 0.32 ** 0.34 **
5 Experience 4.01 0.65 180 0.62 ** 0.65 ** 0.57 ** 0.48 **
6 Operational knowledge sharing 3.38 0.74 180 0.36 ** 0.61 ** 0.44 ** 0.36 ** 0.53 **
7 Strategic knowledge sharing 3.94 0.63 180 0.63 ** 0.61 ** 0.48 ** 0.30 ** 0.60 ** 0.52 **
8 Need for tax knowledge 3.68 1.09 176 0.01 0.18 * 0.13 *0.11 0.06 0.10 0.17 *
9 Provision of tax specialists 0.46 0.50 180 *0.28 ** 0.09 *0.11 *0.23 ** *0.15 * 0.06 *0.15 * 0.14
10 HMRC as knowledge source 3.78 0.90 179 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.06
11 Number of employees 10781 48653 179 *0.25 ** 0.02 *0.03 *0.26 ** *0.10 *0.01 *0.09 0.12 0.15 * 0.07
12 Number of tax jurisdictions 8.93 21.17 171 *0.05 0.15 * 0.08 *0.07 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.20 ** 0.01 0.35 **
Note. *p < .05 (2 tailed) **p  < .01 (2 tailed).  
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 Dependent variable: 
Operational knowledge sharing  
 
Dependent variable: 
Strategic knowledge sharing 
Independent variables: Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Strategic knowledge 
sharing 
 
 
 0.250 
2.50*** 
   
Operational knowledge 
sharing 
     0.187 
2.19** 
Value  
 
-0.018 
0.19 
-0.123 
1.14  
0.417 
4.45*** 
0.420 
4.70*** 
Access  
 
0.430 
3.63*** 
0.334 
3.14***  
0.382 
3.85*** 
0.302 
3.27*** 
Benefits - general  
 
-0.023 
0.21 
-0.014 
0.14  
-0.036 
0.36 
-0.032 
0.35 
Benefits - specific  
 
0.170 
2.13** 
0.206 
2.78***  
-0.147 
2.30** 
-0.179 
2.74*** 
Experience  
 
0.197 
1.92* 
0.156 
1.62  
0.165 
1.66** 
0.128 
1.37 
Need for tax knowledge 0.088 
1.17 
0.016 
0.27 
-0.006 
0.11 
0.191 
2.61*** 
0.087 
1.76* 
0.085 
1.78* 
Provision of tax specialists 0.020 
0.26 
0.059 
0.94 
0.082 
1.35 
-0.181 
2.44** 
-0.093 
1.72* 
-0.104 
1.96* 
HMRC as knowledge source 0.086 
1.15 
0.060 
1.02 
0.037 
0.63 
0.145 
2.00** 
0.091 
2.01** 
0.080 
1.78* 
Number of  employees -0.081 
 1.02 
0.009 
0.23 
0.015 
0.36 
-0.137 
1.77* 
-0.025 
0.65 
-0.026 
0.66 
Number of tax jurisdictions 0.162 
2.02** 
0.067 
2.09** 
0.064 
2.14** 
0.109 
1.40 
0.011 
0.30 
-0.002 
0.06 
Constant n/a 
9.75*** 
n/a 
0.41 
n/a 
-0.64 
n/a 
13.45*** 
n/a 
1.07 
n/a 
1.16 
n 180 180 180 180 180 180 
F test 1.51  
(5, 174) 
15.82*** 
(10, 169) 
15.05*** 
(11, 168) 
3.74** 
(5, 174) 
20.33*** 
(10, 169) 
18.07*** 
(11, 168) 
 Adj R
2
 0.015 0.397 0.422 0.071 0.550 0.568 
Max VIF 1.17 2.68 3.02 1.17 2.68 3.00 
Breusch-Pagan  0.47  
(1) 
5.27**  
(1) 
6.50*** 
(1) 
1.63 
(1) 
4.01* 
(1) 
6.69*** 
(1) 
1. *, ** and *** - significant (single tail) at the 5, 2.5 and 1% level respectively. 
2. Robust (White-corrected) standard errors are employed in the presence of significant heteroscedasticity as 
indicated by Breusch-Pagan test statistic.  
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Table 1: Analysis of missing values by question 
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Table 2:  Hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting knowledge sharing (N = 166) 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Operational knowledge sharing  
 
Dependent variable: 
Strategic knowledge sharing 
Independent variables: Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Strategic knowledge 
sharing 
 
 
 0.305 
3.16*** 
   
Operational knowledge 
sharing 
     0.243 
2.70** 
Value  
 
0.015 
0.18 
-0.113 
1.04  
0.418 
4.26*** 
0.415 
4.50*** 
Access  
 
0.456 
4.82*** 
0.336 
3.20***  
0.395 
3.98*** 
0.285 
3.11*** 
Benefits - general  
 
0.018 
0.22 
0.041 
0.43  
-0.073 
0.72 
-0.077 
0.86 
Benefits - specific  
 
0.143 
1.87* 
0.193 
2.59***  
-0.165 
2.35*** 
-0.200 
2.87*** 
Experience  
 
0.151 
1.62 
0.099 
1.10  
0.168 
1.60 
0.131 
1.39 
Need for tax knowledge 0.106 
1.35 
0.022 
0.36 
-0.004 
0.07 
0.196 
2.57*** 
0.085 
1.62 
0.080 
1.61 
Provision of tax specialists -0.009 
0.12 
0.043 
0.64 
0.080 
1.28 
-0.194 
2.51** 
-0.121 
2.12** 
-0.131 
2.34** 
HMRC as knowledge source 0.083 
1.06 
0.073 
1.19 
0.043 
0.71 
0.125 
1.65** 
0.099 
2.02** 
0.081 
1.66* 
Number of  employees -0.083 
 0.99 
0.018 
0.26 
0.028 
0.64 
-0.151 
1.86* 
-0.033 
0.84 
-0.038 
0.89 
Number of tax jurisdictions 0.161 
1.92* 
0.054 
0.82 
0.051 
1.72* 
0.109 
1.34 
0.009 
0.24 
-0.004 
0.12 
Constant n/a 
9.19*** 
n/a 
0.90 
n/a 
1.20 
n/a 
13.27*** 
n/a 
1.34 
n/a 
1.55 
n 166 166 166 166 166 166
F test 1.46  
(5, 160) 
12.66*** 
(10, 155) 
13.47*** 
(11, 154) 
3.61*** 
(5, 160) 
19.83*** 
(10, 155) 
20.47*** 
(11, 154) 
 Adj R
2
 0.014 0.414 0.454 0.073 0.533 0.565 
Max VIF 1.17 2.52 2.88 1.17 2.52 2.90 
Breusch-Pagan  0.37  
(1) 
3.73*  
(1) 
4.13* 
(1) 
1.40 
(1) 
5.24** 
(1) 
9.36*** 
(1) 
1. *, ** and *** - significant (single tail) at the 5, 2.5 and 1% level respectively. 
2. Robust (White-corrected) standard errors are employed in the presence of significant heteroscedasticity as 
indicated by Breusch-Pagan test statistic.  


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Table 3: Hierarchical regression analyses – Non-engaged responses excluded (8 obs)  
 Dependent variable: 
Operational knowledge sharing  
 
Dependent variable: 
Strategic knowledge sharing 
Independent variables:  Model 2 Model 3  Model 2 Model 3 
Strategic knowledge 
sharing 
 
 
 0.024 
2.40*** 
   
Operational knowledge 
sharing 
     0.180 
2.11** 
Value  
 
0.015 
0.11 
-0.085 
0.77  
0.416 
4.25*** 
0.413 
4.41*** 
Access  
 
0.418 
3.59*** 
0.330 
3.03***  
0.372 
3.75*** 
0.296 
3.18*** 
Benefits - general  
 
-0.039 
0.25 
-0.030 
0.29  
-0.041 
0.41 
-0.034 
0.37 
Benefits - specific  
 
0.140 
1.96** 
0.177 
2.30**  
-0.159 
2.42** 
-0.184 
2.79** 
Experience  
 
0.208 
1.94* 
0.168 
1.70*  
0.166 
1.67* 
0.128 
1.37 
Need for tax knowledge  0.008 
0.17 
-0.014 
0.24  
0.093 
1.75* 
0.091 
1.80* 
Provision of tax specialists  0.066 
0.92 
0.089 
1.36  
-0.095 
1.64 
-0.107 
1.87* 
HMRC as knowledge source  0.053 
0.92 
0.032 
0.52  
0.088 
1.84* 
0.078 
1.66* 
Number of  employees  0.018 
0.25 
0.025 
0.54  
-0.029 
0.71 
-0.032 
0.76 
Number of tax jurisdictions  0.053 
2.15** 
0.049 
1.33  
0.016 
0.37 
0.007 
0.17 
Constant  n/a 
0.41 
n/a 
0.52 
 n/a 
1.21 
n/a 
1.25 
N  172 172  172 172 
F test  13.27*** 
(10, 161) 
12.53*** 
(11, 160) 
 17.48*** 
(10, 161) 
15.64*** 
(11, 160) 
 Adj R
2
  0.366 0.390  0.526 0.544 
Max VIF  2.57 2.88  2.57 2.86 
Breusch-Pagan   4.93*  
(1) 
5.72** 
(1) 
 4.58* 
(1) 
6.78*** 
(1) 
1. *, ** and *** - significant (single tail) at the 5, 2.5 and 1% level respectively. 
2. Robust (White-corrected) standard errors are employed in the presence of significant heteroscedasticity as 
indicated by Breusch-Pagan test statistic.  


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Table 4: Hierarchical regression analyses – Extreme values number_tax_jurisdictions (10 obs)  
and number_employees (5 obs) 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Operational knowledge sharing  
 
Dependent variable: 
Strategic knowledge sharing 
Independent variables:  Model 2 Model 3  Model 2 Model 3 
Strategic knowledge 
sharing 
 
 
 0.252 
2.40*** 
   
Operational knowledge 
sharing 
     0.184 
2.11* 
Value  
 
-0.035 
0.40 
-0.142 
1.28  
0.427 
5.76*** 
0.434 
4.91*** 
Access  
 
0.433 
4.41*** 
0.338 
3.09***  
0.380 
4.52*** 
0.300 
3.29*** 
Benefits - general  
 
-0.052 
0.58 
-0.043 
0.41  
-0.034 
0.45 
-0.024 
0.26 
Benefits - specific  
 
0.198 
2.51** 
-0.238 
3.03**  
-0.160 
2.36** 
-0.196 
2.76*** 
Experience  
 
0.191 
2.01* 
0.149 
1.52  
0.169 
2.08** 
0.134 
1.40** 
Need for tax knowledge  0.008 
0.13 
-0.009 
0.15  
0.070 
1.26 
0.069 
1.37 
Provision of tax specialists  0.044 
0.59 
0.060 
0.83  
-0.062 
0.98 
-0.070 
1.14 
HMRC as knowledge source  0.057 
0.90 
0.036 
0.56  
0.086 
1.59 
0.075 
1.58 
Number of  employees  0.078 
1.10 
0.079 
1.72*  
-0.007 
0.12 
-0.021 
0.79 
Number of tax jurisdictions  -0.032 
0.46 
-0.010 
0.21  
-0.088 
1.48 
-0.082 
1.64 
Constant  n/a 
0.23 
n/a 
0.42 
 n/a 
1.07 
n/a 
1.02 
n  167 167  167 167 
F test  10.60*** 
(10, 156) 
20.33*** 
(10, 167 
 20.33*** 
(10, 167 
20.33*** 
(10, 167 
 Adj R
2
  0.366 0.392  0.537 0.555 
Max VIF  2.53 2.86  2.53 2.84 
Breusch-Pagan   3.53  
(1) 
4.36* 
(1) 
 3.17 
(1) 
4.99* 
(1) 
1. *, ** and *** - significant (single tail) at the 5, 2.5 and 1% level respectively. 
2. Robust (White-corrected) standard errors are employed in the presence of significant heteroscedasticity as 
indicated by Breusch-Pagan test statistic.  
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